



ORIGINATOR: CHIEF CONSTABLE

PAPER NO: AP22/24

**SUBMITTED TO: ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE PANEL –
13 MAY 2022**

SUBJECT: NEIGHBOURHOOD CRIME AND ASB

SUMMARY:

1. This report outlines the Constabulary's approach to tackling neighbourhood crime (robbery, burglary and vehicle crime) and Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB). It details the current performance, demand, and activity with the inclusion of statistical information where relevant.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. The Police and Crime Commissioner is asked to consider the report and raise issues (as appropriate) with the Chief Constable.

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 This report outlines the Constabulary's approach to tackling Anti-Social Behaviour and neighbourhood crime. As such, it directly reports on related commitments in Objective 1 of the Police and Crime Plan.
- 1.2 The response to Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) and neighbourhood crime is a priority for Suffolk Constabulary and is highlighted as one of the 6 areas of focus within the Force Plan 2020/23. It is acknowledged that anti-social behaviour and neighbourhood crime can have a detrimental effect on the local community and that an appropriate policing response is required to ensure public trust and confidence is maintained.
- 1.3 The Constabulary response to ASB and neighbourhood crime is managed through a variety of departments within the Constabulary. The prevention and detection of ASB and crime is the role of all officers and staff employed within front facing roles and within some back-office functions. Whilst historically ASB has been seen as the primary role of Safer Neighbourhood Teams (SNT) and burglary/robbery the focus of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) there has been a forward movement towards a whole force approach to the prevention, detection and long-term problem solving for these and other crime types.
- 1.4 The data used in this report is accurate to the 31st March 2022, unless otherwise stated. In total in the last 12 months there has been a 2% decrease neighbourhood crime across Suffolk.

2. ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Data

ASB	Last 12 Months	Three Year Average	% Difference (L12M to TYA)	Previous 12 months	% Difference (P12M to L12M)
ASB Environmental	903	898	0.60%	1097	-17.70%
ASB Nuisance	6551	6811	-3.80%	7787	-15.90%
ASB Personal	1444	1371	5.30%	1468	-1.60%
ASB Total	8898	9080	-2.00%	10352	-14.00%

2.1 Governance

Suffolk Constabulary's Western Area Commander is responsible for the strategic oversight of ASB, aligning our organisation response to the Pursue strand of the Neighbourhood Policing Strategy. Work continues to review and improve existing ASB policies and procedures, this work is organised through a continuous improvement plan (CiP) and managed by the ASB Delivery Group supported by internal ASB Champions.

The County ASB Steering Group is now established and feeds into the Safer and Stronger Communities Board. This steering group has support from both Suffolk County Council and all district councils and is a direct link to Community Safety Partnerships and council ASB leads.

2.2 Key areas of work

- i) **Risk Assessment** - Work has been completed to embed an understanding and better use of risk assessments available when dealing with ASB. The Risk Assessment Matrix (RAM) has been in use for several years. However, its use previously relied upon paper records and the transposition of those records onto force computer systems. Now, when a call is received by the Contact and Control Room (CCR) the RAM question set is completed at first point of contact and recorded on the call log (CAD). This action will provide an early indication of

potential risk linked to the ASB call. A series of flowcharts have been produced to guide call takers, dispatchers, and front-line staff in the most appropriate route for progression for each CAD based on potential risk. This process provides a standardised, force wide, approach to dealing with ASB and ensures, each victim receives the same level of service regardless of location. The result of these actions is that Inspectors are notified of high-risk incidents at the earliest opportunity, allowing for the effective allocation of resources, and better oversight via discussion at Daily Management Meetings (DMM). Better ownership and accountability for officers and staff dealing with ASB and an increased focus on potential harm and victim safeguarding.

- ii) **Forcewide Learning and Continued Professional Development (CPD)** – Work has been completed on toolkits to assist officers in dealing with ASB. Toolkits and other learning material can be found on the ASB intranet pages within the Neighbourhood Partnership Team (NPT) area of the intranet. These provide walk through guides and self-study material to aid officers and staff to deal with ASB both effectively and efficiently. Advice and guidance for CCR staff can be found within their own private area of the intranet. A monthly Neighbourhood Policing Team Bulletin document has been launched, the first publication in February 2022 focussed solely on ASB and ASB continues to be a theme of the document due to the number of Incidents that have an ASB element. A three-hour ASB training package has been designed and continues to be delivered to all frontline CPC staff. The training provides and overview of ASB legislation, powers, policies, and new procedures adopted by Suffolk Constabulary. Within the training is an in-depth look at a case study of the case of Bijan Ebrahimi, who died in Bristol in 2013. The serious case review following his death highlighted several failings and recommendations of the police service, many of which are relevant to our current organisational learning. The delivery of this training continued throughout April. In addition to the three-hour training package, all probationary officers receive a one-hour ASB input as part of their initial training. This input focussed on the basics of ASB and takes a brief look at the case of Fiona Pilkington.
- iii) **Quality Assurance and Review** – The work of the ASB Review team is ongoing. The team was established in January 2022 to review all ASB CADs from October 2021 to the present day. The team are reviewing each CAD on a set criterion and highlighting failures and learning to officers and staff. This review includes failures relating to Home Office Crime Recording Standard (HOCRS) and failures to follow internal ASB policies. The findings are fed back to officers and supervisors for corrective action to take place. It is hoped this process will create a culture of learning and getting it right first time. Feedback from the review team is that as they progress through CADs, they are seeing an improvement in officers' initial response to ASB, meaning a reduction in the feedback they are providing to individual officers and staff. An ASB Scrutiny Panel has been established which dip samples a ASB CADs and provides a peer review process for each incident reviewed. The panel will follow the CAD from first point of contact to investigation finalisation and assess its compliance with policies, procedures and statutory obligations. Where points for learning are identified this is fed back to the officer via the panel host.
- iv) **ASB Case Review** – Work has been completed with our community partners, Suffolk County Council, and all district councils within Suffolk to agree a standard process for dealing with ASB case reviews (Community Triggers (CT)). The CT process is a victim led process and allows a victim to hold relevant authorities to account if certain criteria is met. Work has been completed on updating our internal processes, including representation at case reviews by Inspector's to promote effective decision making and partnership working.
- v) **Information Sharing** – ECINS is partnership information sharing platform that the constabulary has used for several years, it's use had declined since the introduction of Athena. The Constabulary is committed to the continued use of ECINS as its main platform for

information sharing with community partners. A process for recording all high risk ASB cases on the platform has been introduced, this process is easier and less onerous on individual officers than previous processes and utilises ECINS as a reference library rather than a duplicate recording of the information being recorded on Athena. The ECINS platform will feed into local ASB meetings held between police and key strategic community partners. Where previously the constabulary has been represented by PCSOs or PCs, it will now be represented by Locality Inspectors. This change will mean more decisions can be made during or sooner following meetings than previously, increasing our effectiveness and efficiency when responding to higher risk cases.

2.3 The Future

A county wide CiP is in progress and continues to be built upon. All actions relating to ASB improvement will be recorded and updated within this document. A review of the existing ASB policy is currently underway. This review will ensure the ASB policy reflects the improvement work that has already been completed and any future improvements that will take effect. This will ensure we have an ASB policy that is clear and directive to aid officers in dealing with ASB and promote a culture of ownership and accountability. The County Steering group are working with our community partners to improve and streamline our processes relating to Closure Orders. It has been established that the cost to the public purse for a closure order to be applied for and enforced by local councils is considerably less than if the process is led by the police service. Work is underway to establish how we can deliver best practice to make sure the communities of Suffolk receive the best possible service and value for money. Internally work is being undertaken to establish the best and most efficient process for recording where and when Section 35 (ASB Crime & Policing Act 2014) and Section 60 search powers are utilised.

2.4 Anti-Social Behaviour Civil Orders open March 2022

The use of civil orders is an important tool in tackling ASB and targeting perpetrator behaviour. Used effectively, civil powers can set out clear boundaries to perpetrators and highlight which specific aspects of their behaviour has a detrimental impact on the community and must be addressed to comply with the conditions imposed upon them through use of each legislative power. The number of current live civil powers in effect across the force is as follows.

ORDER	TOTAL
Community Protection Notice Warning Letters (CPNWL)	35
Community Protection Notice (CPN)	33
Criminal Behaviour Orders (CBO)*	4
Injunctions**	2

* CBOs that have been granted at court

** Injunctions obtained by police as lead agency

2.5 Examples of organisational growth

Example 1 – An ongoing issue was highlighted to police via a CAD of incidents of repeat ASB targeting local businesses and residents within a housing estate in west Ipswich. By use of the RAM the risks and potential harm was recognised by officers. A Problem Solving Plan (PSP) was created. Local officers engaged with the community by carrying out community engagement events and going door to door to fully understand the issue. The SARA problem

solving model was followed and from this officers were able to carry out effective pro-active and re-active patrols, which identified key perpetrators. Working in partnership with Ipswich Borough Council (IBC) and other community partners funding was obtained to set up a youth club and arranged sporting events, including free transport for participants. Future funding has been obtained to improve local parks and amenities. The identified perpetrators continue to engage with diversion activities delivered by the Youth Justice Service (YJS) and many participate at the youth club and sporting activities. Police demand in the area relating to ASB has decreased.

Example 2 – A vulnerable adult male with significant care needs had been reporting incidents to police for around two years. Many of these lacked suitable evidence and perpetrators had not been identified. Following the implementation of the new ASB processes, he called police and a RAM was completed by the call taker. This identified the incident as high risk. The incident was recorded on Athena and a comprehensive investigation plan was created with victim safeguarding at its heart. Within a few days, covert recording equipment was placed inside the victims address and within two weeks four perpetrators were identified. The perpetrators were interviewed and remain under investigation while consultation with YJS took place. Meanwhile, officers liaise with the local council and other community partners to find support for the male. Following meetings between police and the housing provider action is taken to improve boundary fencing, install outside lighting and a CCTV camera at the address. Since the action taken against offenders and target hardening at the address the ASB demand has severely reduced.

Example 3 – A whole family were being subject to repeated ASB, harassment and intimidation for approximately two years. The family were being targeted by a specific group of youths and three main perpetrators were identified. To fully understand the issues in the area a community survey was completed of nearby properties and from this it became clear there was a wider ASB issue linked to a local park. An ECINS record was created, and police liaised with community partners to address the issue. The perpetrators were approached by police and effective interventions put in place. Work in the community continued with educational inputs being delivered at the local school, Police Cadets held engagement events to facilitate communications between residents young and old, the targeted family were provided with crime reduction advice to target harden their property and wider community engagement by community partner took place at the local park. These actions contributed to a reduction in demand for police resources.

3. NEIGHBOURHOOD CRIME – RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY

- 3.1 Crime, Safeguarding and Incident Management (CSIM) have overall ownership of the response to dwelling burglary offences. The primary responsibility sits with CID and monitored by Detective Inspectors. Further monitoring takes place through force and local performance practices.
- 3.2 The Detective Inspectors have an overview of all offences and are responsible for the identification of crime trends and serial offenders. A suspect focussed approach is undertaken and using the Area Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group(ATTG) process, suitable resources are allocated to arrest and process perpetrators.
- 3.3 The changes in social behaviour and the increase in working from home both during and post the COVID outbreak has seen a significant reduction in offences within this crime type. The offence is now less attractive to criminals due to lower numbers of available and viable target premises, there is an increased chance in detection at the time of the offence due to the number of people working in their or nearby homes.

- 3.4 Insight, an analysis and data collection program, allows managers and staff to look at overall force trends down to individual localities. Areas with higher numbers of crimes or lower detection rates are highlighted and reviewed with an improvement plan instigated where and when required. The data below is an overview of current demand in this crime type.

Residential Burglary	Last 12 Months	Three Year Average	% Difference (L12M to TYA)	Previous 12 months	% Difference (P12M to L12M)
Offences Recorded	737	1055	-30.2%	776	-5.0%
Number Solved	124	174	-28.6%	112	10.7%
Percentage Solved	16.8%	16.5%	0.3%	14.4%	2.4%

- 3.5 Burglary residential is a CSIM priority and is encompassed in daily business for the CID teams. They work closely with the Operation Converter teams to maximise solve rates and provide victims with a high level of service. Where any person is arrested or charged with a residential burglary the Converter team are notified and will establish if the person wishes to take any offences into consideration. In the last 12 months they have aided the detection of 58 residential burglary offences which may have otherwise remained unsolved.
- 3.6 Operation Reflux relates to the burglary of homes to steal gold/jewellery and/or using cleaning products to frustrate forensic evidence collection. This offence type can disproportionately target the Asian community due to the cultural relevance of the items stolen. Whilst Suffolk has seen low levels of offending the force is linked into regional units and other forces to identify and target known organised crime groups (OCG) and undertake enforcement action.
- 3.7 Operation Hepworth related to an organised crime group committing offences within the county and nationally. Following a large-scale investigation and police operation the members of the group were arrested and the case is currently being considered by the CPS complex case team to authorise charges against key members of the group.

4. NEIGHBOURHOOD CRIME – BURGLARY (COMMERCIAL)

- 4.1 The geographical make up of Suffolk makes this type of crime attractive to perpetrators. Many commercial premises are within isolated rural areas and the road network makes it easy to travel in and out of Suffolk to neighbouring counties.
- 4.2 Many reports of commercial burglary are routed via the Crime Co-Ordination Centre (CCC). Once reports are received by the CCC they are assessed based on investigative opportunities. Where forensic or CCTV enquires are identified these are assigned to local officers for progression. Generally commercial burglaries will be investigated by the Safer Neighbourhood teams who will also provide security and crime reduction advice.
- 4.3 Offences that are linked, often with out of force offenders or complex/protracted investigations are owned by CSIM. Appropriate resources are allocated to investigate these offences. Operation Edgemond is an example of this. Op Edgemond relates to a series of 40 high value offences from farms and other rural locations. The investigation is managed by the Serious Crime Disruption Team, who have made arrests and are currently waiting CPS charging advice.
- 4.4 There have been an additional 187 offences of burglary, which incorporates both commercial and 'other buildings' detected through the Operation Converter team in the preceding 12 months.

5. NEIGHBOURHOOD CRIME – THEFT OF AND THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLE

5.1 Advances in technology, working from home and the ability to immobilise and track vehicles have all seen a long-term trends towards less vehicle crime.

5.2 Given the number of vehicles within the county, the number stolen are a statistically small amount. The data below provides an overview of policing demand in relation to this crime type.

TOMV	Last 12 Months	Three Year Average	% Difference (L12M to TYA)	Previous 12 months	% Difference (P12M to L12M)
Offences Recorded	558	636	-12.3%	593	-5.9%
Number Solved	52	83	-37.3%	64	-18.8%
Percentage Solved	9.3%	13.1%	-3.7%	10.8%	2.3%
TFMV	Last 12 Months	Three Year Average	% Difference (L12M to TYA)	Previous 12 months	% Difference (P12M to L12M)
Offences Recorded	1187	1806	-34.3%	1452	-18.3%
Number Solved	39	67	-41.9%	49	-20.4%
Percentage Solved	3.3%	3.7%	-0.4%	3.4%	0.3%

5.3 A proportion of theft from motor vehicle offences relate to the ongoing trend of catalytic converters being stolen from unattended vehicles. This is a national trend and not a crime type confined to Suffolk. This type of theft is often perpetrated by OCG's (organised crime groups) who travel across county borders to commit their crimes. Op Pull21 is a locally commissioned operation to problem solve these offences county wide. The research contained within this plan has provided valuable data to customise our approach to reducing this type of crime within our county. CPC officers have undertaken several "Cat Marking" sessions, specifically inviting owners of the most affected vehicles to have their catalytic converters marked. All UV torches in marked vehicle have been upgraded to the latest 365nm standards in order that all commercially available forensic marking products show up under the light. Since the implementation of this operation the number of cat thefts has reduced.

6. NEIGHBOURHOOD CRIME - ROBBERY

6.1 Robbery remains core business for both criminal investigations departments and local policing. The response to these offences is well established and embedded in the operating practices of all front-line resources.

6.2 The number of robbery offences in the last 12 months has seen a decrease. The below data gives an overview of the policing demand linked to robbery offences.

ROBBERY	Last 12 Months	Three Year Average	% Difference (L12M to TYA)	Previous 12 months	% Difference (P12M to L12M)
Offences Recorded	273	382	-28.5%	276	-1.1%
Number Solved	51	65	-21.3%	67	-23.9%
Percentage Solved	18.7%	17.0%	1.7%	24.3%	-5.6%

6.3 Robbery offences are reported through the force DMM to ensure local, and investigations senior managers have oversight and an understanding of the trends and issues. This also provides for a robust system to allocate investigations and manage safeguarding risks.

- 6.4 CSIM retain responsibility for performance, with local Detective Inspectors allocated to perform monthly and quarterly reviews and report on the current picture regarding youth offending, county lines linked crime and business offences.
- 6.5 A Force Robbery Plan is reviewed quarterly and managed by the Southern Area Detective Inspectors. This plan looks at trends, policing responses and the use of best evidence and problem solving to continue the trend towards crime reduction.

7. USE OF PROTECTIVE POWERS

- 7.1 Op Investigate was introduced to improve investigations standards and investigator knowledge in relation to PIP level 1 investigations. This saw the roll out of specific training to front line uniformed officers and supervisors. Work to improve the knowledge of officers and staff in relation to civil protective powers is continuing. Civil powers such as CPNs, CBOs and injunctions can assist in preventing burglary and robbery offences. Utilising these powers will ensure a focus on crime prevention is considered in all cases. A table documenting our current usage of civil powers can be found in section 2.4.
- 7.2 County Policing Command resources are provided briefings and intelligence relating to any identified series offences or offenders to ensure a targeted and effective approach to preventing offences and pursuing offenders.
- 7.3 Currently there are no identified series offences or persons believed to be actively committing multiple burglary or robbery offences in Suffolk.

8. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS

- 8.1 None

9. OTHER IMPLICATIONS AND RISKS

- 9.1 From first point of contact resources are assessing our response based on the THRIVE principles. Using a standard approach to assess all calls for service ensures consistent delivery across the force. Also, this approach helps to build trust and confidence from within the community as each demand is assessed using the same process.
- 9.2 The principles of THRIVE are to assess the potential threat. This could be a physical threat (loss or damage to property/personal injury), psychological or threat to policing (loss of trust and confidence).
- 9.3 Once the threat is identified the potential harm that could be caused should the threat be carried out is assessed. Potential harm can take many forms and ranges from serious threats to life to minor community disruption or not harm at all.
- 9.4 The next stage of THRIVE is to assess the likelihood of the threat or harm taking place. The result of this assessment will dictate the speed at which we deploy to the call.
- 9.5 The final stages of THRIVE are to consider if an investigation is likely to be required and if that investigation has viable lines of enquiry. Where no potential lines of enquiry are identified the call can be routes via the CCC, who will record the investigation and update the victim. This saves front line officers time to respond to more urgent threats within the community.
- 9.6 In all cases the victim's vulnerability is assessed. A person is vulnerable if as a result of their situation or circumstances, they are unable to take care of or protect themselves or others

from harm or exploitation. History tells us that vulnerable people within the community are likely to be targeted by perpetrators of neighbourhood crime, ASB and hate crime. Often the cumulative effect of these seemingly low-level crimes can have a devastating effect on the individual both mentally and physically. By identifying vulnerability, we can be flexible in our approach and deploy resources appropriately.

- 9.7 For all calls and interactions with the public, as a service, we should consider our approach to engagement. Is there an opportunity to engage with hard-to-reach groups? Can we manage expectations and signpost to a more relevant agency? Are there self-service options that would be better for the caller? (Action Fraud, Crime Stoppers etc).
- 9.8 In all cases resources are deployed based on the immediate available information, whether this is from the caller or research. Higher threat, harm, risk, or significant vulnerability is likely to result in a more immediate police response than low threats and no vulnerability.